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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiff Timothy M. Burgh, an African-American male, 
applied for a job as a part-time police officer with the 
Borough of Montrose (Pennsylvania) Police Department. He 
was not hired for the position, which was filled by a white 
male with no prior on-the-job police experience. Bur gh 
brought suit against the Borough under T itle VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e, et seq., and under 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. C.S. 
S 951, et seq., alleging that the Bor ough did not hire him 
because of his race. The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Borough and against Burgh on 
both counts, finding that the claims had beenfiled beyond 
the applicable statutory limitations periods. For the reasons 
that follow, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment 
and remand both claims to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
The facts underlying the instant dispute have not been 
developed in detail, given the early stage at which the 
matter was resolved in the District Court. Bur gh's 
complaint is the only pleading in the recor d and no 
discovery has been taken. 
 
According to the complaint, in April 1993, Bur gh applied 
for a position as a part-time police officer with the 
Borough's police department. He updated this job 
application sometime before June 1994. In April 1994, 
Burgh accepted a position as a part-time police officer in 
the Clifford Township (Pennsylvania) Police Department. 
Clifford Township is located appr oximately 25 miles from 
Burgh's home in South Montrose. 
 
In June 1994, the Montrose Police Department hired a 
white male, allegedly with no prior on-the-job police 
experience, as a part-time police officer,filling the position 
that Burgh had sought. The Montrose Police Department 
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did not interview Burgh for this, or any other , position. 
Burgh alleges that he was more qualified than the person 
hired and that the department failed to hir e him because of 
his race. 
 
On December 8, 1994, Burgh filed a char ge of racial 
discrimination against the Borough with the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission (PHRC) under the PHRA, 43 
Pa. C.S. S 955(a).1 The PHRA claim was filed within 180 
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, the 
Borough's failure to hire Bur gh because of his race. The 
state administrative complaint was therefor e timely. See 43 
Pa. C.S. S 959(h). 
 
Burgh requested that his complaint be r eferred to the 
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) for dual filing as a Title VII char ge. The federal 
claim was accepted and docketed by the EEOC on Mar ch 
20, 1995. This claim was filed within 300 days of the 
alleged discriminatory employment practice and it too was 
timely. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1). On May 20, 1995, the 
EEOC sent Burgh a letter advising him of thefiling of his 
Title VII claim. The letter stated that the EEOC would 
investigate and resolve the charge and that the Commission 
must issue a Notice of Right Sue before Bur gh could file a 
court action under Title VII. 
 
On March 18, 1996, the PHRC sent Burgh a letter 
advising him that it had been one year since hefiled his 
complaint with the PHRC and notifying him that he now 
had the right to bring a private civil action under the PHRA 
in the Court of Common Pleas. The letter stated that Burgh 
was not required to file such a private action and that the 
Commission was continuing to process his case and would 
make every effort to resolve it as soon as possible. If, 
however, Burgh did wish to file in state court, the 
Commission would dismiss the administrative complaint 
and would not decide the case. The letter further advised 
Burgh to ensure that any complaint was pr operly filed, 
particularly that it was timely filed, and to consult an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The administrative complaint was not time-stamped and docketed 
with the PHRC until December 24, 1994. However , the parties have 
stipulated to the December 8 filing date. 
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attorney about representing him in court. There is no 
dispute that Burgh received this letter . Burgh never filed an 
action in the Court of Common Pleas. The PHRC appar ently 
took no further action on the administrative char ge. 
 
Sometime prior to October 1998, Burgh r etained counsel. 
On October 19, 1998, Burgh's attorney sent a letter to the 
EEOC, requesting that the agency issue a right-to-sue letter 
in "light of the Pennsylvania Commission's extended delay 
in resolving this matter." The EEOC on December 1, 1998, 
sent a letter to Burgh's attorney, advising Burgh of his right 
to institute a civil action under Title VII within 90 days of 
receipt of that letter. Burghfiled his lawsuit, alleging 
violations of Title VII and the PHRA, in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His 
suit was filed on February 26, 1999, 87 days after the 
right-to-sue letter was issued. 
 
On May 28, 1999, Burgh moved for default judgment; 
this motion was withdrawn by stipulation, dated June 21, 
1999. On June 28, 1999, the Borough filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6), contending that, because Bur gh had brought 
suit beyond the applicable statutes of limitations, his 
discrimination claims were untimely. 
 
The District Court notified both parties during a case 
management conference that the motion would be treated 
as one for summary judgment; both parties agr eed to rest 
on their memoranda and neither requested the opportunity 
to file additional evidence. On November 16, 1999, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants. 
 
The District Court held first that Burgh could not rely on 
the fact that he had not received a right-to-sue letter from 
the EEOC prior to December 1998 as reason for the delay 
in filing his action because to "accept Plaintiff's argument 
we would have to decide we could wait forever to file suit 
even when the commission takes no action and fails to 
notify the Plaintiff. This flies in the face of the basic reason 
for a statute of limitations." The court then determined that 
the issuance of a right-to-sue letter was not a necessary 
prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action. In 
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reaching this conclusion, the court relied on case law 
holding that the PHRC's failure to issue a notice of right to 
sue after one year does not bar a civil action under the 
state statute. See Rogers v. Mount Union Bor ough by Zook, 
816 F. Supp. 308, 316 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Snyder v. 
Pennsylvania Ass'n of Sch. Retirees, 566 A.2d 1235 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989)). The court concluded that each agency 
should have responded to Burgh's administrative 
complaints within one year of filing with that agency--the 
PHRC by December 8, 1995; the EEOC by March 20, 1996. 
The court reasoned that after the passage of one year, 
Burgh could have brought a private civil action on the 
federal and state claims. As a result, the statute of 
limitations for each claim began to run on the one year 
anniversary of its filing with the agency. 
 
The District Court went on to determine the period after 
the one-year anniversary within which a complainant could 
bring suit. Because the court found no specific limitations 
period in Title VII, it decided to borr ow a state statute of 
limitations governing an analogous cause of action. The 
court held that Pennsylvania's two-year limitations period 
for personal injury actions, which has been applied to 
federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, 
should govern Title VII. The court found a rationale for this 
conclusion in the fact that both statutes pr ovide redress for 
employment discrimination. Working fr om March 20, 1996, 
the one-year anniversary of the referral of the complaint to 
the EEOC, the court held that Burgh had until March 20, 
1998, to file suit.2 Because he did not file until February 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is worth noting that, even assuming ar guendo that the District 
Court's approach to the limitations issue was correct as a matter of law, 
its application of the limitations period to this case was incorrect. 
Under 
federal law, the EEOC has 180 days to process a claim and notify the 
complainant of the result; the complainant may request a right-to-sue 
letter after that 180 days. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. 
S 1601.28(a). There is no provision in the statute that supports the 
application of a one-year period from the filing of the EEOC charge as a 
limit for the filing of a court action. Ther efore, even if a two-year 
limitations period were to be grafted onto T itle VII, the two-year period 
should have begun to run on September 16, 1995, 180 days from the 
March 20 EEOC filing. It would then have lapsed on September 16, 
1997, even earlier than the District Court deter mined. 
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1999, his suit was 11 months late and therefor e time- 
barred. 
 
The District Court did note that the inaction of the PHRC 
and EEOC was partially to blame for the delays. However, 
the court held that the filing of the action almost five years 
after the filing of the first administrative complaint was 
"clearly unreasonable" and therefor e untimely. This timely 
appeal followed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had original federal question 
jurisdiction over the Title VII claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and supplemental 
jurisdiction over the PHRA claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(a). We have appellate jurisdiction over the final 
decision of the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment, which is 
subject to plenary review, applying the same legal standard 
used by the District Court. See Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 
766, 772 (3d Cir. 1999); Ideal Dairy Far ms, Inc. v. John 
LaBatt, Inc., 90 F.3d 838, 841 (3d Cir . 1996). Further, the 
issue of the proper limitations period under T itle VII is 
primarily a legal one, involving the interpr etation of federal 
law, and our review is plenary. See Lavia v. Pennsylvania 
Dep't of Corrs., 224 F.3d 190, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Summary judgment is appropriate when ther e are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P 
56(c); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Both Title VII and the PHRA make it unlawful to fail or 
refuse to hire or employ an individual because of that 
individual's race or color. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1); 43 
Pa. C.S. S 955(a). The analysis of the claims is identical. 
See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 
317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Jones v. School Dist. of 
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Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999)). Both 
statutes also establish administrative remedies and 
procedures that claimants must exhaust prior to bringing a 
civil action in court. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5, 43 Pa. C.S. 
S 962(c); see also Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding, in Title VII case, that plaintiff must 
exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in 
court); Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 
A.2d 917, 921 (Pa. 1989) (holding that the intended forum 
for initially addressing PHRA claims is the PHRC); Bailey v. 
Storlazzi, 729 A.2d 1206, 1214 (Pa. Super . Ct. 1999) 
(holding that plaintiff must exhaust administrative 
remedies under PHRA prior to bringing case to court). The 
statutes have slightly different r equirements in terms of 
timing and scope of the administrative remedy. Because 
this case turns on the precise requirements of each statute, 
an overview of the statutory provisions is helpful. 
 
A. TITLE VII 
 
Under Title VII, a charge of race discrimination in 
employment must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days 
of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice. The EEOC must serve notice of the char ge on the 
employer within ten days of the filing of the char ge. See 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. 
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359 (1977). If the complainant also 
initiates a complaint with a parallel state agency, as 
occurred in the instant case, the period forfiling the charge 
with the EEOC is extended to 300 days from the date of the 
alleged unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(e)(1). 
 
The EEOC is then required to investigate the charge, see 
Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 359, and the complainant must 
allow a minimum of 180 days for the EEOC investigation to 
proceed. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Occidental 
Life, 432 U.S. at 361 (holding that a private right of action 
does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed). 
The congressional policy underlying this framework was to 
resolve discrimination claims administratively through 
cooperation and voluntary compliance in an infor mal, 
noncoercive manner. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 363; 
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Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 93 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
If, after 180 days, the EEOC has not resolved the charge, 
it must notify the complainant, see 42 U.S.C. S 2000e- 
5(f)(1), generally through the issuance of a"right-to-sue" 
letter, in which the EEOC states that it sees no reason to 
take action on the complaint. See Waiters v. Parsons, 729 
F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984). After 180 days, the 
complainant on his own may also request a right-to-sue 
letter. The EEOC must issue the letter pr omptly on request. 
See 29 C.F.R. S 1601.28(a)(1). The receipt of the right-to-sue 
letter indicates that a complainant has exhausted 
administrative remedies, an essential element for bringing 
a claim in court under Title VII. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 
93 (citing Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 
398 (3d Cir. 1976)) ("The preliminary step of the filing of the 
EEOC charge and the receipt of the right to sue notification 
are `essential parts of the statutory plan."'). A complainant 
may not bring a Title VII suit without havingfirst received 
a right-to-sue letter. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 87; Robinson, 
107 F.3d at 1020. Nothing in the statute or the regulations, 
however, requires a complainant to request a right-to-sue 
letter or to bring a private suit. Nevertheless, if the 
complainant does choose to bring a private action, it must 
be filed within 90 days of the date on which the 
complainant has notice of the EEOC's decision not to 
pursue the administrative charge. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e- 
5(f)(1). The on-set of the 90-day period is generally 
considered to be the date on which the complainant 
receives the right-to-sue letter. See Seitzinger v. Reading 
Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Mosel v. Hills Dept. Store, Inc. v., 789 F.2d 251, 52 (3d Cir. 
1986) (per curiam). 
 
Both the 180-day period for filing the administrative 
complaint3 and the 90-day period for filing the court action 
are treated as statutes of limitations. See Zipes v. Trans 
World Airways, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (likening 
requirement of timely filing of administrative charge to 
statute of limitations); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Or the 300-day period if there is a parallel state filing. 
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F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1999) (same with respect to time for 
bringing court action after receipt of right-to-sue letter). We 
have strictly construed the 90-day period and held that, in 
the absence of some equitable basis for tolling, a civil suit 
filed even one day late is time-barred and may be 
dismissed. See Figueroa, 188 F .3d at 176. In our review of 
this case, we must keep in mind, however, that the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run unless and until there 
is "final agency action," such as the issuance of a right-to- 
sue letter. See Waiters, 729 F .2d at 237. Without that final 
agency action, the complainant has not exhausted his 
administrative remedies and cannot bring suit. See 
Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 87. 
 
B. THE PHRA 
 
The PHRA similarly requires that claims be brought first 
to an administrative agency, the PHRC, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the claim for a period of one year in order 
to investigate and, if possible, conciliate the matter. See 
Clay, 559 A.2d at 920 (quoting Lukus v. W estinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 419 A.2d 431, 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)). A 
complainant may not file an action in court for a period of 
one year. See Clay, 559 A.2d at 921; 43 Pa. C.S. S 962(c)(1). 
If the PHRC does not resolve the administrative charge 
within one year, the commission must notify the 
complainant that he may bring an action in the Court of 
Common Pleas. See 43 Pa. C.S. S 962(c)(1); see also Snyder, 
566 A.2d at 1240 (holding that where a complainant has 
not had her grievance resolved by the PHRC within one 
year of filing, she could pursue another course, namely, an 
action in the judicial system). Importantly, and unlike 
under Title VII, notice of the right to sue is not required in 
order to bring the PHRA action. Instead, after one year has 
elapsed, a complainant may bring a court action r egardless 
of whether or not he has received a letter fr om the PHRC. 
See Snyder, 566 A.2d at 1240. No case law suggests, 
however, that a complainant must bring the civil action 
then or at any later time. 
 
Moreover, the PHRA does not limit the time, after receipt 
of the one-year notice, within which a civil action must be 
brought. The statute does provide that any civil action must 
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be filed within two years after notice from the PHRC that it 
is closing the complaint. See 43 Pa. C.S.S 962(c)(2).4 The 
PHRC one-year notice is not, however, the equivalent of 
notice that the PHRC is closing the complaint. A r eview of 
the notice sent to Burgh illustrates this point. The letter 
states that Burgh was not required to file suit in court, that 
the Commission was continuing to process the case and 
would make every effort to resolve it as soon as possible, 
and that only if Burgh filed a complaint in state court 
would the PHRC dismiss the complaint. 
 
C. IS THERE A GAP IN THE TITLE VII LIMITA TIONS 
       PERIODS 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment on 
Burgh's Title VII claim, applying the Pennsylvania two-year 
statute of limitations to Title VII as a gap-filler and running 
the limitations period from the date on which Burgh could 
have requested a right-to-sue letter fr om the EEOC. Under 
this application of limitations, the court found Bur gh's 
claim to be untimely. 
 
It is well-established that, if Congress has cr eated a 
cause of action and not specified the period of time within 
which a claim must be asserted, a court may infer that 
Congress intended state limitations periods to apply and 
may borrow such periods and engraft them onto the federal 
statute. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 367; see also id. 
(citing, inter alia, Runyon v. McCrary , 427 U.S. 160, 179-82 
(1976) (state limitations period applies to Civil Rights Act of 
1866, 42 U.S.C. S 1981) and O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 
318 (1911) (same as to Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983)). We have borrowed two-year personal injury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This provision was added to the PHRA in 1991. Some courts had held 
prior to the amendment that Pennsylvania's two-year statute of 
limitations for personal injury, 42 Pa. C.S. S 5524(7), applied to PHRA 
claims. See Raleigh v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 550 A.2d 1013, 1014 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); see also Long v. Board of Educ. of City of 
Philadelphia, 812 F. Supp. 525, 534 (E.D. Pa.) (relying on Raleigh in 
dismissing as time-barred PHRA claims that wer e not brought within two 
years of the plaintiff's receipt of notice of her right to sue), aff'd 8 
F.3d 
811 (3d Cir. 1993) (mem.). 
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limitations periods from the states and imposed them in 
both S 1981 claims, see Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 
222 (3d Cir. 2000), and S 1983 claims. See Nelson v. County 
of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir . 1995). Where, 
however, Congress explicitly provides a limitations period in 
the text of the statute, that period is definitive. There is no 
need to borrow a state period. See Holmber g v. Armbrecht, 
327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). 
 
Contrary to the Borough's arguments, T itle VII is not a 
statute without a limitations period. Congress did provide a 
statutory limitations period for employment discrimination 
claims; in fact, Congress provided two periods. First, a 
complainant has 180 days from the occurr ence of the 
alleged unlawful employment practice within which to bring 
a discrimination charge before the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(e)(1), or 300 days where ther e has been cross- 
filing with a state agency under state law. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(e)(1). Second, a complainant has 90 days from 
receipt of the right-to-sue letter to bring an action in court. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Seitzinger, 165 F.3d 
at 239; Mosel, 789 F.2d at 252. Both periods have been 
treated as statutes of limitations. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 
393; Figueroa, 188 F.3d at 176. The latter limit is strictly 
enforced and a delay of even one day will bar a claim. See 
Figueroa, 188 F.3d at 176. 
 
These two periods together represent the congressional 
determination of the relevant and pr oper time limitations 
under Title VII. The imposition of an additional limitations 
period is inconsistent, and indeed in direct conflict, with 
the plain language of the federal statute. Ther e is no gap to 
fill and thus no need to import a state limitations period as 
a gap-filler. The statute by its ter ms establishes the two 
appropriate time requirements that a complainant must 
satisfy in order to bring a timely claim. 
 
Furthermore, the two-year limitations period urged by 
the Borough would conflict with the timetables established 
in Title VII. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 368-69 & n.23. 
For example, in the most basic case, if a complainant 
requests and receives a right-to-sue letter exactly 180 days 
after he files his EEOC charge, the statute gives him 90 
days to bring his action in court, see 42 U.S.C. S 2000e- 
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5(f)(1), while the borrowed state limitations period would 
give him two full years (640 additional days) tofile his 
action. To complicate matters further, a complainant would 
have no guidance as to which limitations period controlled. 
In the instant case, Burgh unquestionably satisfied the 
timing requirements established by the text of the statute: 
He received the right-to-sue letter on December 1, 1998, 
and filed his civil action on February 26, 1999, 87 days 
later. There is no time period pr ovided in the statute that 
Burgh failed to satisfy. 
 
The Borough recognizes this conflict but nonetheless 
argues that the borrowed state limitations period should 
apply here, relying on a decision fr om the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, Rode v. Dellarciprete , 646 F. Supp. 876 (M.D. 
Pa. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part , 845 F.2d 1195 (3d 
Cir. 1988). But the Borough misr eads Rode. In Rode, the 
District Court dismissed a S 1983 claim as untimely under 
a borrowed state two-year limitations period. See Rode, 646 
F. Supp. at 882. But the court did not dismiss the Title VII 
claim as untimely. In fact, a careful r eview of Rode shows 
that the District Court found plaintiff's T itle VII allegations 
were not barred by laches, as alleged by defendants, since 
defendants had not shown that the delay had caused them 
any prejudice. See id. at 883. 
 
Moreover, other courts of appeals have r ejected the 
argument that state statutes of limitations should be 
borrowed in Title VII cases. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
time limits for filing a charge with the EEOC and for giving 
notice to the employer of that charge "ar e a Congressionally 
established statute of limitations" and ther e is no basis 
under the statute to import a different period from state 
law. See Kirk v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 578 F .2d 814, 819 (9th 
Cir. 1978). Concurring specially, Judge Hufstedler stated 
that "Title VII's time provisions fully define the steps which 
must be taken by a Title VII litigant to pr eserve his or her 
right to sue. State statutes of limitations ar e not borrowed 
because there is no gap to fill." Id.  at 824. The Sixth Circuit 
reached the same conclusion in Draper v. United States 
Pipe and Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir. 1975), 
noting the specific time periods for filing a charge with the 
EEOC and for commencing a civil action after r eceipt of the 
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right-to-sue letter, and holding that "T itle VII establishes its 
own statute of limitations, and state law is irr elevant in 
determining whether a private individual has lost his right 
of action under Title VII through the passage of time." 
 
We can also derive guidance from our decision in Waddell 
v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F .2d 69 (3d Cir. 1986), a 
case involving procedural delays similar to those in the 
instant case. In Waddell, the plaintiff filed a failure-to- 
rehire charge with the PHRC in February 1977; this charge 
was referred to the EEOC for cross-filing in March 1977. In 
April 1977, the PHRC dismissed the charge and notified the 
plaintiff, but not the EEOC, of that dismissal. The PHRC 
did not send any notification to the EEOC until November 
1981, more than 4 years later. In the meantime, the 
plaintiff wrote two letters to the EEOC inquiring about his 
case, the first in April 1977, the second in September 1977. 
In May 1983, the plaintiff learned that he could request a 
right-to-sue letter, which he did; he r eceived the letter in 
June 1983 and brought suit in August 1983, within 90 
days of receipt of the letter. The issue then was whether the 
plaintiff's claim should be barred by the equitable doctrine 
of laches, based on the plaintiff's failur e to diligently pursue 
his claim, either administratively or by seeking a right-to- 
sue letter at an earlier time. See id. at 74-75. We ultimately 
remanded the case to the District Court to determine 
whether the defendant had established the elements of a 
laches defense. See id. at 79-80. Ther e is, however, no 
mention in Waddell of any statute of limitations; nor is 
there any suggestion that the plaintiff had violated a 
statutory limitations period -- either federal or state-- in 
bringing his civil action more than seven years after filing 
the administrative charge and almost six years after his last 
letter to the EEOC. 
 
We note, finally, that the limitations scheme provided for 
in Title VII is consistent with Congress's intent that most 
complaints be resolved through the EEOC rather than by 
private lawsuits. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 366 
(discussing Senate Report). Congress's concer n that the 
"fair operation" of Title VII required a time limitation was 
focused on when a charge was filed with the EEOC and a 
defendant received notice of that charge. Id. at 371. The 
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"benchmark, for purposes of a statute of limitations, is not 
the last phase of the multistage scheme, but the 
commencement of the proceeding before the administrative 
body." Id. at 372. Title VII establishes a clear period of 180 
days following the alleged unlawful employment decision to 
file an administrative charge with the EEOC (or parallel 
state agency) and to provide notice of the char ge to the 
defendant ten days later. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1). This 
notice gives the defendant the opportunity to gather and 
preserve evidence in anticipation of court action. See 
Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 372-73. Statutes of limitations 
exist, in part, to ensure such notice to the adversary. See 
Barnes v. The Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F .3d 127, 151-52 (3d 
Cir. 1998) ("The theory [of statutes of limitations] is that 
even if one has a just claim it is not unjust to put the 
adversary on notice to defend within the period of 
limitation.") (citations omitted). 
 
Congress wanted cooperation and voluntary compliance 
to be the primary means of resolving claims in an informal 
and noncoercive manner. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 
367-68; Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 93 (holding that the statutory 
plan of Title VII was aimed at correcting discrimination 
through informal administrative conciliation). This goal of 
resolving problems by conciliation is better met by enacting 
a limitations period for filing a court action that runs from 
the receipt of the right-to-sue letter at the end of the 
administrative process rather than from the date of the 
unlawful employment practice. 
 
For all the above reasons, we conclude that there is no 
gap in Title VII that requires the grafting on to it of any 
state limitations period. Burgh's Title VII claim, filed within 
the statutory period of 90 days from receipt of the right-to- 
sue letter from the EEOC, was timely filed and may go 
forward. 
 
D. IS THERE A GAP IN THE PHRA LIMITA TIONS 
       PERIODS 
 
We turn now to Burgh's PHRA claim. This involves an 
issue of state law, requiring us, as a federal court sitting in 
diversity on this claim, to apply state substantive law, 
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statutory and decisional as interpreted by the highest court 
of the state. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938); McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 825 (3d 
Cir. 1994). In the absence of a reported decision on point by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we must look to the 
decisions of the intermediate appellate courts for guidance. 
See McKenna, 32 F.3d at 825. In the absence of guidance 
from the state supreme court or any inter mediate appellate 
courts, we must predict how the state supr eme court would 
resolve this issue if it were befor e that court. See 
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Resseguie, 980 F.3d 226, 229 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
In its opinion, the District Court conflated T itle VII with 
the PHRA in applying the one-year period after filing the 
administrative complaint as the accrual of the time to file 
suit. The court held that the limitations period on the PHRA 
claim began running one year after Burgh hadfiled the 
administrative charge, on December 8, 1995, because at 
that point Burgh had exhausted his administrative 
remedies and could have brought his claim in court. The 
court held that this period for bringing a court action 
expired two years later.5 
 
Like Title VII, the PHRA establishes two limitations 
periods: first, the administrative charge must be filed by a 
complainant with the PHRC within 180 days of the alleged 
discrimination, see 43 Pa. C.S. S 959(h); second, a court 
action must be filed within two years of the date that the 
PHRC gives the complainant notice of the closing of the 
administrative complaint. See 43 Pa. C.S.S 962(c)(2). As in 
Title VII, these periods represent the complete legislative 
determination as to the appropriate timing provisions 
under the PHRA. There is no basis for a court, particularly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As it did on the Title VII claim, see supra note 2, the District Court 
calculated the PHRA dates improperly. The court started the clock on the 
PHRA claim on March 20, 1996, one year after the EEOC charge was 
filed. The court stated that this was to give the plaintiff the benefit of 
all 
reasonable factual inferences. But thefiling of the EEOC charge is 
irrelevant to any limitations period under the PHRA. If the District Court 
was correct that the PHRA limitations period began to run one year after 
the filing of the PHRC charge, the clock would have expired on December 
8, 1997. 
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a federal court sitting in diversity, to engraft any additional 
limitations periods as gap-fillers. There ar e no statutory 
gaps to be filled. 
 
As we note in footnote 4, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court in Raleigh v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 550 A.2d 
1013, 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), did apply the 
Pennsylvania two-year personal injury statute of limitations 
to bar plaintiff's claim. Raleigh, however, was decided in 
1988, prior to the 1991 amendments to the PHRA that 
added the two-year limitations period from the dismissal of 
the administrative complaint now contained in S 962(c)(2). 
Because Raleigh is inconsistent with S 962(c) as amended, 
we will not follow it. We similarly decline to follow our 
dictum in Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 
227 F.3d 78, 90-91 (3d Cir. 2000), which cited Raleigh in 
stating that Pennsylvania's two-year personal injury 
limitations period applies to PHRA claims. Finally, we 
disapprove the District Court decisions in Onibokun v. 
Berks County Children and Youth Servs. , Civ. No. 98-4402, 
1999 WL 681697 (E.D. Pa. 1999) and Long v. Boar d of 
Educ. of City of Philadelphia, 812 F. Supp. 525, 534 (E.D. 
Pa. 1993),6 both of which applied the two-year limitations 
period to PHRA claims, running from the date of the 
plaintiff's receipt of the right-to-sue letter. 
 
Unlike Title VII, the PHRA limitations period for bringing 
suit, S 962(c)(2), does not run from the date of receipt of the 
letter from the PHRC one year after filing, but from the date 
of notice that the PHRC closed the complaint. Mor eover, the 
PHRC one-year letter does not automatically close the 
complaint and trigger S 962(c)(2), as a r eview of the March 
18, 1996, letter to Burgh illustrates. That letter provided 
that the "Commission is continuing to process your case, 
and we will make every effort to resolve it as soon as 
possible. If we are not notified otherwise, we will assume 
that you want the Commission to continue handling your 
case." The PHRC informed Burgh that it would close his 
complaint only if he filed an action in court. Furthermore, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Borough relies on the fact that we summarily affirmed the District 
Court in Long. See 8 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 1993) (mem.). However, such a 
summary affirmance is not precedential and not binding on this panel. 
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there is nothing in the record to indicate that the PHRC 
ever closed Burgh's administrative char ge. Thus, the 
S 962(c)(2) two-year period never began to run on Burgh's 
state claim. 
 
Nor under the PHRA was Burgh ever requir ed to 
commence litigation. The District Court relied on the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Snyder v. 
Pennsylvania Ass'n of Sch. Retirees, 566 A.2d 1235 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) and the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
decision in Rogers v. Mount Union Borough by Zook, 816 F. 
Supp. 308 (M.D. Pa. 1993), to conclude that Bur gh could 
have brought suit on the one-year anniversary of the filing 
of the administrative claims and the limitations clock 
started on that date. In Snyder, 566 A.2d at 1242, the 
Superior Court held that a plaintiff could pr oceed into 
court, even absent the issuance of a right-to-sue notice, on 
a discrimination charge that had been br ought before the 
PHRC and had remained there for at least one year. In 
Rogers, 816 F. Supp. at 316, the court cited Snyder for the 
proposition that the lack of issuance of a right-to-sue notice 
does not bar the civil action on the grounds of failure to 
exhaust. 
 
Both cases are distinguishable. In both, the plaintiffs had 
gone to court without having received right-to-sue notices 
and, in both, the courts were addressing and rejecting the 
defendants' argument that the claims should be dismissed 
because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies. Both courts held that the expiration of the one- 
year period in S 962(c)(1) was sufficient exhaustion under 
the statute. These cases stand for the proposition that a 
PHRA plaintiff may, after one year , with or without a letter 
from the PHRC, forego the administrative process and bring 
his discrimination claim in court. 
 
Neither case, however, stands for or supports the 
proposition that a plaintiff must do so on pain of losing that 
claim to a rigid statute of limitations. In fact, we can predict 
that a more appropriate view of Pennsylvania law would 
hold that a plaintiff should not be required to cut short the 
administrative process in favor of litigation. This prediction 
is supported by the legislative policy underlying the PHRA, 
as discussed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Clay, 
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supra. The Supreme Court held that the state legislature 
intended "that the PHRC would bring to bear particular 
expertise in handling discrimination cases." Clay, 559 A.2d 
at 919. The legislature sought to create an administrative 
scheme that would ensure maximum use of the PHRC's 
expertise in the area of unlawful discrimination. See id. at 
920 (quoting Lukus, 419 A.2d at 455). The PHRC is granted 
exclusive jurisdiction for one year in order to carry out its 
expert function. See Clay, 559 A.2d at 920 (quoting Lukus, 
419 A.2d at 455); see also Clay, 559 A.2d at 921 (holding 
that parties were restrained from judicial recourse for a 
period of one year after bringing an administrative charge). 
It follows that the policy underlying the PHRA, like the 
policy underlying Title VII, is to per mit the administrative 
process to continue to completion and to allow the PHRC 
adequate time to resolve the case, rather than having the 
plaintiff cut short that process and r esort to litigation. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the limitations period for 
Burgh to bring his PHRA action did not begin to run on the 
one-year anniversary of the filing of his PHRC claim. 
Because the PHRC never closed the administrative 
complaint, the limitations period on his PHRA claim never 
started. The state claim was timely filed and may go 
forward. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the statute of limitations did 
not lapse either on Burgh's Title VII claim or on his PHRA 
claim; both claims are timely and both may go forward. We 
will reverse the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment in favor of the Borough and r emand 
this matter to the District Court for further pr oceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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